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Community Ecology and Ideological Polarization
Ideological Polarization and Organizational Form
Evolution: A Study of Islamic–Secular Rivalry
and High Schools in Turkey, 1971–1998
Christophe Boone, University of Antwerp
Anıl Divarcı Çakmaklı, İstanbul Şehir University
Arjen van Witteloostuijn, VU Amsterdam
How do rival organizational forms that are associated with different ideologicalvalues affect each other’s growth? And how do ideological polarization andstate regulation impact the growth of these rival organizational forms? We
adopt a community ecology framework as the stepping-stone to answer these ques-
tions in the context of a study of the dynamics of the Turkish high school educational
system from 1971 to 1998—a period characterized by important regulatory changes
amid growing ideological polarization between religious Islamic and secular factions.
We explore how micro-level ideological Islamic–secular polarization and macro-level
state regulation as to female participation may impact the meso-level interaction
among high school forms. We demonstrate that rival organizational forms affect each
other’s growth positively, on average, but that this mutualism is reduced by ideologi-
cal polarization and reinforced by the increase in female participation in Islamic high
school education.
Introduction
Interdependencies between different populations of organizations have long been
understudied (Ingram and Simons 2000). However, a growing number of commu-
nity ecology studies focus on sets of functional and/or spatial relationships
between different organizational forms (Freeman and Audia 2006). As organiza-
tions affect the communities they belong to and are also affected by those commu-
nities, such work has the potential to “spread the relevance of results beyond
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İstanbul Şehir University, Orhantepe Mahallesi, Turgut Özal Bulvarı, No: 21, 34865 Dragos,
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organizationally defined problem areas” (Freeman and Audia 2006, 145). In this
study, we apply such community analysis to explore how the reciprocal interplay
of political and ideological struggles in societies impacts the emergence and preva-
lence of different organizational forms (Barnett and Woywode 2004; Boone and
Özcan 2014; Schneiberg, King, and Smith 2008; Simons and Ingram 2004). As
formal organizations are carriers of ideologies, their emergence and diffusion are
major outcomes and drivers of social and political change (Barnett and Woywode
2004). Scholars agree that such work is therefore likely to advance organization
theory “especially in light of recent criticisms that the field has lost sight of its mis-
sion to identify the role of organizations in society” (Simons and Ingram 2004,
34; see also Hinings and Greenwood [2002]).
Only a limited number of studies have directly addressed how ideology affects
the interdependencies between organizational forms in a community context.
Two competing hypotheses, both supported by empirical evidence, have been pro-
posed (Simons and Ingram 2004). The first hypothesis suggests that ideological
affinity between organizations is an important source of mutualism: organizations
that share the same set of ideological values positively co-evolve together. The sec-
ond hypothesis claims that ideological similarity goes hand in hand with overlap-
ping resource utilization: this increases competition between forms that share the
same ideological values (Barnett and Woywode 2004). Simons and Ingram (2004)
tried to reconcile these seemingly contradictory positions by invoking a key con-
tingency—that is, the populations’ location in resource space, an important con-
cept in ecology theory (van Witteloostuijn and Boone 2006). Ideological similarity
is argued to be a source of mutualism when organizational forms do not share key
resources, but a source of competition when they occupy similar positions in
resource space. Current empirical evidence appears to be consistent with this uni-
fying proposition (Simons and Ingram 2004).
There is, however, an important blind spot in the literature on the ecology of
ideology because ideological dissimilarity and how it affects interdependencies
between organizational forms that compete for resources have seldom been stud-
ied (Simons and Ingram 2004). Given that ideological struggles between rival
ideologies are main drivers of social and political change, this is unfortunate
(Barnett and Woywode 2004; Olzak and West 1991). We relate to this by study-
ing how an ideological struggle in society affects the prevalence of organiza-
tional forms carrying these rival ideological values, and whether such an
ideological struggle is a source of competition or mutualism among these rival
organizational forms. This is our first contribution.
The interaction among rival organizational forms does not appear in a vac-
uum. Especially given the value-laden tensions associated with rival ideologies,
the institutional and local environmental conditions are extremely important
(Boone and Özcan 2014; Marquis and Huang 2009; Wade, Swaminathan, and
Saxon 1998; Wholey and Sanchez 1991). We therefore analyze the interplay
between polarization of local ideological preferences, central government regula-
tion, and the dynamics of rival organizational forms. We explore how ideologi-
cal polarization and state regulation may impact the ecological interaction
among rival value-laden organizational forms. By doing so, we explicitly
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recognize that the type of interdependence between rival organizational forms is
likely to be time and place bound (Aldrich 2009; Boone and Özcan 2014). Most
studies in this tradition, however, assume that the ideological contextual climate
and critical resource base are constant over time. By directly measuring shifts in
polarization and resource niches, we show that the mutualistic interdependence
between rival ideological forms is suppressed by increasing polarization (as re-
flected in election outcomes) and reinforced by resource niche expansion
(through state regulation). This is our second contribution.
We develop specific hypotheses that are tested in the Turkish high school com-
munity context in the 1971–1998 period. We analyze how religious Islamic–secu-
lar ideological polarization in Turkish society affects the growth at the district
level of two school forms carrying oppositional ideologies: religious high schools
that provide Islamic education (so-called Imam Hatip schools) and cosmopolitan
high schools that provide Western-based secular education in foreign languages
(so-called Anatolian schools). We investigate the conditions that affect the nature
of interdependencies between organizational forms that carry this pair of rival ide-
ologies. So, we seek to provide a richer understanding of the mechanisms and im-
plications of ideological contention for the organizational dynamics of the
Turkish high school educational system.
The empirical setting we study is particularly interesting for our purposes for
two reasons. First, the Turkish Republic is characterized by an old ideological ten-
sion involving the role of religion, particularly of Islam, in public life. In the twen-
tieth century, ideological pressure was gradually built up to increase the role of
Islam in public life, and to develop a kind of Turkish–Islamic synthesis. However,
this triggered opposition from adherents of “Western”-style ideologies, leading to
deep ideological polarization in Turkish society. As education is an extremely
important vehicle for the diffusion of ideologies and values in societies (Nielsen
and Hannan 1977), the Turkish high school educational system was and still is a
major battlefield (Güven 2005), where this ideological polarization materializes
via the establishment of Islamic and secular high schools.1 These rival high school
dynamics are driven by both central government regulation trying to control high
school densities and diversity, and local demand for different forms of high school
education as reflected by ideological preferences. Given that data are available at
the Turkish district level, we have both substantial cross-sectional and longitudi-
nal variation, which offers the opportunity to examine the interplay of local ideo-
logical environments with high school organizational ecologies in the context of
local communities. Such local variation is essential (though seldom available; see
Marquis and Huang [2009, 1223]) to evaluate the contingent nature of the conse-
quences of nationwide public educational policies. In addition, our setting allows
us to substantiate Freeman and Audia’s (2006) plea for studies that focus on ex-
plaining the composition of different organizational forms (in casu high schools)
in particular locales (in casu districts).
Second, during the period of our study, the Turkish context features three
major high school types that prepare students for higher education that nicely
map onto the ideological resource space: regular high schools in the ideological
“center” (which is the dominant secular school type established by Ataturk in
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1924) and two oppositional types at both extremes, where Imam Hatip schools
target the Islamic “tail” and the cosmopolitan schools are squarely located in
the secular “tail.” As these school types all compete for the same resources (i.e.,
students), the setting is ideal to explore the blind spot in the ecology of ideology
literature referred to above (Simons and Ingram 2004). Moreover, the resource
space shifted substantially during the period of our study because only as of
1976 were female students allowed to study at Islamic high schools. This funda-
mental regulatory change moved up the carrying capacity for Islamic high
schools substantially, and altered the nature of competition between Islamic and
cosmopolitan schools, as now the education of females was at stake. Before
developing our hypotheses, we first introduce the details of our setting.
Islamic and Cosmopolitan High Schools in Turkey
Growing Islamic–secular polarization in Turkey in the twentieth
century
The history of modern Turkey starts with the establishment of the Republic in
1923, with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as the founding president. As of 1923,
Ataturk tried to transform the remains of the Ottoman Empire into a modern and
Western-oriented state, based on secular principles, with reforms that unified edu-
cation, abolished Sharia, and introduced a modern civil code inspired by the Swiss
example. Because the Kemalist modernization project implied a major revolution
in the context of a formerly conservative and traditional Islamic society, Islamic
opposition was mobilized from the very beginning (Zurcher 1993). This opposi-
tion eventually gave rise to the emergence of so-called political Islam in the second
half of the twentieth century (Güven 2005; Öniş 1997; Sakallıoğlu 1996).
During the single-party regime of the Republican People’s Party (RPP), the
bureaucracy and army took control of all aspects of public affairs (Weiker 1981).
Because of increasing contention and repression, Turkey shifted to a multi-party
system in 1945. In this era, the population became politically mobilized, demand-
ing to be involved in deciding on the nation’s policies (Weiker 1981). The 1950
elections resulted in the victory of the Democratic Party (DP), which criticized
RPP to be coercive and not sensitive to the needs and traditions of the people, par-
ticularly freedom of religious activity (Ayata 1996). Although the DP remained
loyal to the basic principles of secularism, they emphasized religion as a “neces-
sary social cement for the cohesion of society” (Ayata 1996, 43) in their political
discourse. The DP introduced voluntary Islamic courses into primary schools,
restored the Arabic instead of the Turkish call to prayer, and established Imam
Hatip (i.e., preacher) schools and a Faculty of Divinity at Ankara University.
During the 1950s, the state elite was very critical of the DP government’s poli-
cies (Heper and Keyman 2006). The DP government ended in 1960 with a mili-
tary coup. The DP was closed down and banned from politics. The National
Unity Committee, consisting of army leaders, prepared a liberal-democratic con-
stitution, which was approved by a referendum. This 1960 constitution paved the
way for a period of liberalization, which ended with the prolonged clash of many
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ideologies, especially in the second half of the 1960s and the 1970s. (Landau
1997). In 1970, the National Order Party (NOP), the first openly pro-Islamic
party of the Turkish Republic, was founded. In comparison to the DP, the NOP
introduced a more aggressive discourse in terms of the role of religion in public
life and education, and rejected any type of secularism that could be perceived as
being hostile toward the Islam (Landau 1997). The NOP was banned in 1971
because of violating the secularist principles written in the constitution.
The reason for political/social unrest was not only religious-secular polariza-
tion, but also the emergence of several extreme groups, both left and right wing
(Zurcher 1993). To end this state of chaos, the military took over, again, in
1971. However, this military intervention did not end the chaos. Successive gov-
ernments failed to effectively deal with both economic and political problems.
The ideological spectrum widened even more with the foundation of many polit-
ical parties and social movements, representing all kinds of ideologies, ranging
from extreme left to extreme right, including religious sects and Kurdish separa-
tists (Özbudun 1996). This period cumulated in another military coup in 1980.
Like the earlier coup, the aim of the 1980 military intervention was to defend
the Kemalist principles. However, this coup was also different from the previous
ones in several aspects. First of all, the leaders of the military coup put restric-
tions on individual, group, and organizational freedom (e.g., limiting the role of
labor unions), because they perceived the 1961 constitution to be too liberal in
light of the ideological polarization in Turkish society. Second, they realized that
religion can be a unifying force against fragmentation and contestation caused
by the rise of leftists, socialists, radical religious sects, ultra-nationalists, and
Kurdish separatists (Ahmad 1991; Pak 2004; Salt 1995).
Following the coup, the military government took several measures, including
a reform of the education system, to blend religion and national sentiments in an
attempt to create a more homogeneous society (Yavuz 1997). They opened up
new Qur’anic schools and made religious courses compulsory (Yavuz 1997).
This ideology initiated the development of the so-called “Turkish Islamic
Synthesis” (Güven 2005). This ideology was supported by the center-right
Motherland Party, which took over government after the military. This ideology
began to be disseminated through the educational system and media to the
masses (Yavuz 1997), which eventually led to the victory of the Islamic Welfare
Party in the elections of 1995, and the appointment of the first Islamic Prime
Minister (Necmettin Erbakan) of the Turkish Republic.
At the other side of the ideological spectrum, the secular groups interpreted
these developments as a revolt against Kemalism (Yavuz 1997), which resulted
in an escalation in tension and antagonism between both factions (Güven 2005;
Heper and Güney 2000). The secular counter-movement resonated well not only
among the traditional defenders of the secular Kemalist heritage such as state
bureaucrats, retired army officers, secular journalists, and Kemalist organiza-
tions, but also among adherents of a new wave of Westernization favoring plu-
ralism, freedom of expression, and social equality (Güven 2005). These
platforms challenged the “anti-democratic religious tradition and impinged on
emerging ideas of expanding freedoms and a socially diverse and pluralistic
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form of modernization” (Güven 2005, 203). The increasing role of the Islamic
religion in public life, and particularly in education, was regarded as a threat to
these treasured secular values. This is witnessed by the establishment of several
counter-movement organizations in this era, such as the Association of Kemalist
Thought, the Association of Kemalist Women, and the Support of Modern Life
Association. All these controversies ultimately led to increasing ideological
polarization, dividing Turkey into two very distinct factions: a religious/Islamic
and a secular/Kemalist one.
The Turkish high school educational system
This polarization and contention between ideologies reverberated throughout
the educational sector (Güven 2005). Particularly the high school system was an
important arena, as here the seeds are sown for the development of the future
elite of the country. One of the major strategies of the Islamic movement was the
creation of a counter-elite by strengthening the Islamic stream in the educational
system (Güven 2005). Two main subgroups can be distinguished: general and
vocational/technical high schools. The former educate students for further study
in higher education, such as universities, whereas the latter are orientated at spe-
cific vocations. In the current study, we focus on the regular, Anatolian and
Imam Hatip schools, because they (1) are the most prevalent ones, (2) prepare
students for higher education and entry into the elite, and (3) were engaged in
strong ideological rivalry during the period of our study.2
These three types of general high schools were most salient in the period under
study; the other high school forms (i.e., science high schools, private high schools,
and Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools) are less prevalent and/or originated
more recently. Indeed, including these latter high school types in the models does
not have any effect on the analyses (available upon request). Within our time win-
dow, those who wanted to have a (standard) high school education had to decide
between attending one of these three types of high schools. Because of the ideolog-
ical contention, the educational system experienced many changes in regulations
and restrictions, particularly with respect to the position of Islam in education.
The aim of Ataturk was to provide one unified and secular educational system for
all Turkish citizens (through the regular high schools), which was codified in the
Law of Unification of Educational Instruction in 1924. During the twentieth cen-
tury, however, the number of Imam Hatip high schools expanded to such an
extent that duality in education is, by now, a fact of life (Güven 2005).
The roots of Imam Hatip or Islamic high schools go back to Medresetü-l
Eimmeti vel Hutaba, an educational institution founded in 1913 aimed at educat-
ing imams and preachers. The madrasah were first abolished as a result of the
Law of Unification in 1924, and later re-established in order to educate enlight-
ened imams and preachers who were loyal to the Kemalist ideology. Due to lack
of students, the schools were closed again in 1930. In 1949, Imam Hatip high
schools were opened to offer 10-month courses, monitored by the Republican
People’s Party. It was the Democratic Party that finally established full-fledged
Imam Hatip high schools in 1951. Even though the “official aim”3 of Imam Hatip
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high schools still was the education of imams and preachers, their curricula con-
tained just as much arts and science classes as did regular high schools. As a result,
these high schools provided an educational alternative for the children of Islamic
and conservative families, and therefore gained popularity all around the country.
A first important regulation that positively affected the expansion of Imam
Hatip high schools was the 1973 change in the law. Before the 1973 law change,
the official purpose of Imam Hatip schools was “educating imams and preachers
for religious services.” The 1973 law expanded the official mission of Islamic
schools, including “the preparation of students for higher education.” A very
fundamental second regulation was the one of 1976 that allowed Imam Hatip
high schools to admit female students, even though women cannot be employed
as preachers or imams. This increased the “niche” for Islamic high schools sub-
stantially, as now conservative Islamic families felt comfortable to send their
girls to school (Bozan 2007; Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2006).4 This regulation re-
presents the hallmark of the transformation of Imam Hatip high schools from
Islamic vocational high schools to general educational institutions. The number
of Imam Hatip high schools increased rapidly from 71 in 1971 to 249 by 1980.
Many of these schools were first established by means of public donations, and
staffed afterward by the Ministry of Education. Imam Hatip high schools could
strengthen their position even more after the regulation in 1982, which allowed
their graduates to apply to any faculty program they would like after taking the
university entrance exam. Even though these regulatory changes were initiated
by the government, they can be seen as tactical moves of the Islamic faction in
society to strengthen their position in the high school arena.
Secularists perceived the expansion of both the mission and number of Imam
Hatip high schools as a threat because a growing number of young people were
educated to become not an imam or a preacher, but instead “potential agents of
Islamic traditionalism and a potential source of votes for traditional-fundamentalist
politicians” (Sezer 1993, 23–24). The graduates of Imam Hatip high schools step
by step entered into elite functions in many sectors of Turkish society (Dorian
1997). For example, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current president, graduated
from an Imam Hatip high school before he obtained his university degree. The
growing duality between secular and Islamic education reinforced the ideological
polarization in society. All this brought the issue of Islamic schools onto the politi-
cal agenda again. Specifically, in 1997, the military strongly opposed the Islamic
policy of the government, arguing that “the threat against secularism was now
more serious than formerly” (Esposito 2000, 6). In 1997, the military put the gov-
ernment under pressure to restore the restrictions for the graduates of Imam Hatip
high schools with respect to the university entrance exam.5
Cosmopolitan, or Anatolian, high schools are positioned at the other extreme side
of the ideological spectrum, as their educational curriculum embodies secularist val-
ues and includes education in foreign languages. The first cosmopolitan high schools
were established as alternatives to foreign (e.g., French, German, or Italian) high
schools that provided high-quality and foreign language education in Turkey. The
state was suspicious that students of foreign schools would be influenced too much
by foreign values, and would not sufficiently be taught about their own history and
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culture. Therefore, the government established Turkish high schools in 1955, which
provide education in foreign languages and which accept their students based on the
Nationwide High School Entrance Exam. These Anatolian high schools can be seen
as equivalent to the gymnasium in Germany or the Netherlands, in terms of their stu-
dent acceptance criteria, curriculum, and success. Anatolian high schools claim that,
by giving education in foreign languages, they open up students’ minds, helping
them communicate and be in touch with the rest of the world much more easily. All
course material consisted of books imported from Western countries. The students
who were accepted to these schools were the most competitive ones, and the level of
education was more challenging than in other types of high schools in the period we
analyze. Only one compulsory religious course is taught in cosmopolitan high
schools. This course (of one hour per week) is called “Religion and Morality,” and
is not designed to introduce students to a religious worldview.
Figures 1A and B show the density of Islamic, cosmopolitan, and regular high
schools over time.
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Islamic versus cosmopolitan high schools are located at the opposite sides (or
tails) of the ideological spectrum, with regular schools positioned in the middle
(or center). Both rival forms have strongly dissimilar ideologies, but share a simi-
lar resource base by targeting the country’s potential student population. The
Turkish high school system constitutes a zero-sum game, ceteris paribus; enroll-
ment of a student in one school form goes at the expense of other forms. Islamic
and cosmopolitan high schools might not directly attract (potential) students
from each other, but both aim to enlarge their student base by competing for
center students who would otherwise opt for regular schools.
Predicting the Growth of Islamic and Cosmopolitan High
Schools
Formal organizations play a prominent role in affecting social and political
change by advocating new ideological agendas or by defending the status quo
(Barnett and Woywode 2004; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Olzak and West
1991). Organizations are carriers of ideologies that are often designed to diffuse
and reinforce preferences regarding social outcomes, and the way these out-
comes can be obtained (Simons and Ingram 2004). Particularly, schooling is an
organized activity consisting of organizations that are highly infused with ideol-
ogies, and the schooling system is of major strategic importance to political elites
committed to changing the relationship of the individual to the state or polity
(Nielsen and Hannan 1977). The demand and supply of specific types of school-
ing is, therefore, strongly driven by ideologies that prevail among different inter-
related actors in society, such as parents choosing education for their children
and political elites designing educational policies, and private actors trying to
influence political elites via all sorts of social movement organizations, also to
obtain schooling that fits with their ideology (Güven 2005).
Indeed, in the Turkish context, local communities have opportunities to push
for the establishment of new high schools in their communities. Formally, the final
decision about high school founding is the authority of the Ministry of Education.
However, whether a new high school will be founded and which type of high
school is going to be established can be influenced by the local community and the
local governor, implying that often the decision of the Ministry of Education de-
pends on the needs of the district. For instance, if the local community donates the
necessary buildings and equipment for a new high school, then the government
tends to give permission for the founding of the high school, subsequently assign-
ing teaching staff. In that case, the donating individual(s) have the right to make
the decision as to which type of high school is going to be established. Hence, the
founding process of high schools in Turkey involves both a top-down and a
bottom-up process, implying that both local conditions and local collective actions
are important drivers of new high school formation.
We argue that especially contention between rival ideologies will spur the
growth of organizational forms that carry these rival ideologies—in our case,
high schools. Polarization increases the saliency of individual identities, in-group
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solidarity, and between-group competition and conflict (Esteban and Ray 1994;
Olzak and West 1991; Sherif and Sherif 1953; Simmel 1923). Polarization
between rival ideologies is a very potent mobilizing force, spurring actors to pro-
tect their ideological position by organized activity (Meyer and Staggenborg
1996; Olzak and West 1991). Polarization increases the saliency of ideological
positions by raising the awareness of ideological markers and identities (Olzak
and West 1991). Increasing polarization and contention between opposed ideo-
logical groups also creates the threat that the existing benefits may be taken
away, and/or new harms might be imposed by the opposing group or the state
(Almeida 2003; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Jasper 1997; Tilly 1978; Van Dyke
and Soule 2002).
The growing importance of political Islam triggered secular countermove-
ments that mobilized the secular public opinion against the anti-secular rhetoric
of the former (Güven 2005; Heper and Güney 2000). During this period, espe-
cially Imam Hatip high schools became highly politicized, becoming an instru-
ment for political actors to signal the community’s standing regarding the
religiosity scale. As a result, the need for Imam Hatip high schools and the par-
ents’ willingness to send their children to these schools became an issue of taking
a side with either position on the ideological spectrum. That is why the type of
high school founded in a district is a signal to the local community, which re-
sulted in competition between religious and center-right parties in order to get
Islamic votes (Yavuz 1997).
On top of this, during this period of contestation, many civil society associa-
tions and organizations were formed around Imam Hatip high schools and
Islamist political parties, examples being İlim Yayma Cemiyeti, Ensar Vakfi, and
ÖNDER. These organizations “provided scholarships to Imam Hatip students,
fund dormitories, organize conferences and lobby on behalf of the Imam Hatip
community” (Sarfati 2015, 685). These organizations not only support Imam
Hatip high schools, but also “act as intermediaries between the [Imam Hatip]
schools and Islamist political formations by creating shared identities among stu-
dents, graduates, conservative business circles and activists and by [fostering] a
feeling of trust within religiously conservative communities that the politicians
will recognize” (Sarfati 2015, 685).
Given their curricula and the atmosphere in these schools, Anatolian high
schools represent the other end of the secular-religious dimension (Divarcı
Çakmaklı, Boone, and van Witteloostuijn 2017). Therefore, for secular families
these schools became the best alternative. During this period, graduates of
Anatolian high schools also established associations in support of Anatolian
high schools. In addition to that, many other organizations emerged to form a
countermovement vis-à-vis the Islamic movement, such as the Association of
Kemalist Thought (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği) and the Association for the
Support of Contemporary Living (Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği).
In the decision-making process regarding high school foundings, the move-
ment and countermovement organizations act as mobilizing forces, by targeting
the state in an attempt to influence public policy (Johnson, Agnone, and
McCarthy 2010). As a result of increasing polarization, both polarized groups
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felt threatened (Almeida 2003). If the recipients of this threat are well organized,
the level of collective action and resistance to the threat is expected to be higher
(Almeida 2003; Gould 1991; Jenkins 1983; Walton and Seddon 1994). Such a
cycle of movement and countermovement creates a political opportunity struc-
ture favorable to those organizational forms that carry the associated rival ideo-
logical values, as long as the underlying tensions are not “resolved” by the state
(Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).
Hypothesis 1: Ideological Islamic–secular polarization increases the
growth of both Islamic and cosmopolitan high schools.
Several scholars have contributed to the so-called ecology of ideology by analyz-
ing the ideological drivers of inter-organizational dynamics (Barnett and
Woywode 2004; Boone and Özcan 2014; Minkoff 1994, 1995; Simons and
Ingram 2004; Vermeulen 2013; Wade, Swaminathan, and Saxon 1998). Some
claim and find that ideological similarity between organizational forms is associ-
ated with strong competition (Barnett and Woywode 2004; Vermeulen 2013),
while others report that similar ideologies will help each rival form in forward-
ing their own ideology (Boone and Özcan 2014; Simons and Ingram 2004).
Simons and Ingram (2004) argue that these contradicting findings are due to the
fact that some studies confound ideological similarity with high resource overlap
between organizational forms.
When resource overlap is low and ideological similarity is high, interdepen-
dency between forms is mutualistic. Then, forms sharing similar ideologies enjoy
the benefit of a strong esprit de corps (Barnett and Woywode 2004; Vermeulen
2013), without fighting for the same resources: “organizations can generate
ideological mutualism by sharing experience and information, providing patron-
age, money, encouragement, and legitimacy, and by cooperating in efforts at
political influence” (Ingram and Simons 2000, 34–35). This claim is corrobo-
rated in studies regarding the founding and mortality rates of different types of
cooperatives in Israel during the twentieth century (Ingram and Simons 2000;
Simons and Ingram 2004). The density of credit cooperatives reduces the failure
rate of worker cooperatives (Ingram and Simons 2000), and increases the found-
ing rate of kibbutzim and moshavim, both agricultural cooperatives (Simons
and Ingram 2004). The density of kibbutzim, in turn, suppresses the mortality
rate of worker cooperatives (Ingram and Simons 2000). All these organizational
forms share a similar “socialist” ideology, without competing in the same niche
for resources. In a similar vein, Minkoff (1995, 1997) found that the develop-
ment of the civil rights organizations was an important driver of the subsequent
growth of the number of women’s organizations between 1955 and 1985.
However, when resource overlap is large, the potential benefit of an esprit de
corps cannot compensate for the cost of strong competition. Simons and Ingram
(2004) find that kibbutzim and moshavim affect each other competitively: the
density of the former has a negative effect on the founding rate of the latter and
vice versa, notwithstanding the fact that both forms share a common ideology.
This is due to both forms’ reliance on similar resources for survival, such as
land, distributors, and participants (Simons and Ingram 2004). In their study of
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the Viennese newspaper industry for the period 1918–1938, Barnett and
Woywode (2004) also report that competition among newspapers is strongest
when newspapers share similar ideologies.
Competitive relationships have also been reported for populations that have
dissimilar ideologies, but do not compete for the same resources directly. Due to
competition in the ideological arena, organizations might try to coerce organiza-
tions that carry rival ideologies by withholding resources (Ingram and Simons
2000). Banks, the ideal-typical representatives of the capitalist ideology, have
had a strong influence on the cooperative, socialist form of economic activity in
Israel. Simons and Ingram (1997) report that kibbutzim that relied on banks for
financial input were more likely to adopt capitalist principles, such as employing
hired labor. Bank density indeed increased the failure rate of worker coopera-
tives that were perceived to be close to the core of the socialist ideology (Ingram
and Simons 2000). Similarly, the number of corporations was associated with a
decrease in the founding rate of kibbutzim and moshavim cooperatives (Simons
and Ingram 2004).
Scholars have speculated that when organizations’ ideologies/identities are
dissimilar and the resource overlap is high, there will be conflicting forces im-
pacting their relationship. Although “diametric opponents are hardly friends …
they at least enhance each other’s ideological identity by their sharp contrast”
(Barnett and Woywode 2004, 1461). This might strengthen a population’s iden-
tity, cohesion, and appeal, partially offsetting strong competition in the resource
arena. Simons and Ingram (2004) suggest that ideological rivalry among popula-
tions might promote collective action and the populations’ capacity to build in-
stitutions. Boone and Özcan (2014) claim that this relationship is moderated by
local-level variables. In their study of county-level founding processes of coop-
eratives in the US ethanol industry, they show that local conditions spur and
facilitate collective action among farmers to establish cooperatives in response to
the local diffusion of corporations. It still remains unclear, however, what out-
comes these conflicting forces will generate in different circumstances.
Following the arguments of Simons and Ingram (2004), Olzak and West
(1991), Boone and Özcan (2014), and Barnett and Woywode (2004), we predict
as a baseline that the interdependence between populations (groups) that carry
rival ideologies will be mutualistic. Rivalry between dissimilar ideologies makes
the ideologies extremely sharp and salient, which mobilizes the adherents of
these ideologies to diffuse their values and preferences. This is consistent with
Meyer and Staggenborg’s (1996, 1638) proposition that “when movements
effectively create or exploit events, they are likely to encourage countermove-
ment mobilization at the same time that they advance their own causes.” The
salience argument contends that ideological rivalry “galvanizes” the opposing
groups, and so spurs the formation of formal organizations that carry these ideo-
logical values (Olzak and West 1991, 459). Such organization building mobi-
lizes even more collective action (Tilly 1978), such that the establishment of one
organizational form will reinforce the dynamics of the rival one, leading to
mutualistic interdependence.
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Hypothesis 2a: The growth of Islamic high schools increases with the
number of cosmopolitan high schools.
Hypothesis 2b: The growth of cosmopolitan high schools increases with
the number of Islamic high schools.
However, such a mutualistic relationship is unlikely to hold indefinitely as the
focus of the ideological and resource rivalry eventually becomes the “destruction
of the foe” (Barnett and Woywode 2004, 1461). Vermeulen (2013), for instance,
analyzed to what extent the context affects the form of competition and/or col-
laboration among different ideologies. His analysis of Turkish immigrant orga-
nizations in Germany and the Netherlands reveals that an open, supportive
environment spurs the activities of different ideological groups and also en-
courages intra- and inter-ideological cooperation. Following this logic, we focus
on two context moderators—one repressing mutualism (i.e., increases in ideo-
logical polarization), and the other reinforcing mutualism (i.e., increases in the
carrying capacity).
First, we expect that progressing ideological polarization will eventually repress
the positive impact of the growth of one organizational form on the growth of the
rival form. Although ideological polarization is predicted to spur mobilization ini-
tially (hypothesis 1), further polarization may well intensify competition between
organizational forms associated with these extreme positions. In fact, the ultimate
aim of such mobilization and competition is to repress the rival ideology to
become the dominant one. The political opportunity structure has an important
impact on the ideology that will turn out to be the “winner” (Meyer and
Staggenborg 1996). For instance, in Vienna from 1918 to 1938, the right-wing
newspapers eventually won the contest, destroying the clerical center as “the envi-
ronment of political opportunity shifted in such a way as to give apparent support
for the claims of the extreme right” (Barnett and Woywode 2004, 1489).
We expect that especially the mutualistic effect of the cosmopolitan schools
on their Imam Hatip counterparts will be repressed by Islamic–secular polariza-
tion, because the rapid expansion of the Islamic high schools in the 1970s trig-
gered a cosmopolitan countermovement that gained momentum in a political
environment that gradually became more favorable to secular and Western val-
ues in the second half of the 1980s. We hence expect a negative interaction effect
of Islamic–secular polarization and the density of cosmopolitan schools on the
growth of Islamic high schools. As interaction effects are symmetric, such a neg-
ative interaction implies that we expect that the positive effect of ideological
polarization on the growth of Imam Hatip schools decreases, or may even
become negative, with the density of cosmopolitan high schools.
Hypothesis 3: The positive impact of the number of cosmopolitan high
schools on the growth of Islamic schools decreases (or becomes negative)
when Islamic–secular polarization increases.
Second, what happens when carrying capacity shifts? As discussed in detail by
Soule and King (2008), social movement organizations adopt more specialized
tactical repertoires when competition increases. The law of 1976, which allows
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female students in Imam Hatip schools, can be seen as a tactical move of Islamic
schools, channeled through governmental intervention, to keep up competition
with cosmopolitan schools. This law increased the high school population’s carry-
ing capacity, especially in the Islamic high school niche. Many Islamic parents
who formerly were not willing to send their daughters to regular or other high
schools felt now at ease to enroll their girls in Islamic schools. Competition
between cosmopolitan and Islamic schools entered a new arena—that is, competi-
tion for female education. This not only shifted the opportunity structure for both
organizational forms upward (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), but also revitalized
the mobilization of both rival ideologies. This expansion of the resource niche and
renewed mobilization are expected to extend the sustainability of the mutualistic
interdependence between cosmopolitan and Islamic high schools.
Hypothesis 4a: The growth of Islamic high schools increases with the
number of cosmopolitan high schools especially when the proportion of
female students in Islamic high schools to all female students increases.
Hypothesis 4b: The growth of cosmopolitan high schools increases with
the number of Islamic high schools especially when the proportion of
female students in Islamic high schools to all female students increases.
Data, Measures, and Methods
Our dataset covers the period from 1971 to 1998, for 80 districts in Turkey. Even
though full-fledged Islamic high schools were already founded in the 1950s, they
only became part of the general high school educational field in the beginning of
the 1970s when their official mission was expanded to include the preparation of
students for higher education. Therefore, we start our analysis as of 1971, the year
of the second military coup in Turkey that marks this new era. We end our analysis
in 1998 because a new regulation in 1998 fundamentally transformed the high
school system, implying that the data before and after 1998 are not comparable.
The high school data are obtained from the National Education Statistics that are
published by the Prime Ministry State Institute of Statistics. The core of our dataset
consists of the number of Islamic (i.e., Imam Hatip), cosmopolitan (i.e., Anatolian),
and regular high schools in Turkey that existed between 1971 and 1998.
Following Ruef (2004) and Zhou and van Witteloostuijn (2010), our depen-
dent variable is the first difference of the density (i.e., the number) of Islamic and
cosmopolitan high schools at the district level in time t+1 and time t, respec-
tively.6 As schools were seldom closed in our time period, this first difference
variable is almost tantamount to the number of foundings. For modeling pur-
poses, we therefore can treat this variable as a count, replacing the limited num-
ber of negative first difference values by zeros.7 Our main independent variables
consist of the density of Islamic and cosmopolitan high schools at the district
level. We lagged densities in order to avoid simultaneity. To test the niche expan-
sion H4a and 4b, we employ the (lagged) proportion of female students in the
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Islamic high schools to all female students. For the measurement of polarization,
we take the polarization index proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994). This index
is based on the Gini coefficient, which accounts for both the size of the sub-
groups and distance:
∑ ∑ π π= −α
= =





i j i j
1 1
1
in which k is the scaling factor, π denotes the size of the groups (i.e., the propor-
tion of individuals belonging to group i), −y yi j gives the distance between
groups i and j on a salient continuum (in this study, the religious-secular dimen-
sion), and α refers to the degree of polarization sensitivity that takes a value
between 0 and 1.6 (Esteban and Ray 1994). When α is zero, P equals the Gini
index. The lower α, the more P measures inequality (stressing alienation due to
distance); the higher α, the more sensitive P is to polarization between large
homogeneous subgroups (Stark, Hyll, and Behrens 2010). This measure cap-
tures the intuition that polarization is high when there is high homogeneity
within each group, a high degree of heterogeneity between groups (i.e., distance),
and a small number of groups of significant size (Esteban and Ray 1994). We set
k = 1, and α = 0.8. By doing so, we follow most researchers by giving a balanced
weight to the size of and the distance between the subgroups.
We compute P using the outcomes of parliamentary elections at the district
level to measure religious-secular polarization in the local community. The pro-
portion of each political party’s votes denotes the size of different groups that
vote for each political party in each district. To obtain an indicator of distance,
the second author (who has Turkish nationality) classified political parties on a
secular/religious scale ranging from 1 (extremely secular) to 10 (extremely reli-
gious) (available upon request). In order to score each political party’s religiosity
on this scale, the second author analyzed each political party’s official program
(for this period) to determine its emphasis on religion, and consulted several arti-
cles/books on the religious orientation of political parties during this period
(Cizre 2008; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Çınar 2003; Göle 1997; Keyman 2007; Öniş
2007; Sakallıoğlu 1996; Somer 2007; Yavuz 1997). This classification was
double-checked by two Turkish political scientists. The data on the parliamen-
tary elections are obtained from the Turkish Prime Ministry State Institute of
Statistics. The years without elections were filled in with the election outcomes
from the beginning of the term.
Our main control variables are the density of regular high schools at the dis-
trict level, the (logarithm of) human population at the district level, human pop-
ulation growth at the district level, national GDP in real prices, and the
percentage of government expenditures devoted to education at the country
level, all lagged to avoid simultaneity. Regular high school density is included to
capture the interaction with the high schools in the ideological center. The other
variables are introduced to control for the high school population’s carrying
capacity. We also add the percentage of votes that religious parties received at
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the district level (taking into account the votes received by the parties with a
score of 10). We include dummies for the different official regions in Turkey, as-
signing 1 if the district is in that region and 0 otherwise. We add a dummy vari-
able to control for the years following a territorial change of a few districts (1
for the years after the change, and 0 otherwise). Finally, to control for the impor-
tant regulations of 1976 (that allowed female students to enroll in the Islamic
high schools) and 1997 (that restored the university restrictions on the graduates
of the Islamic high schools), we enter time dummies (0 before and 1 after the
regulation).
Since our dependent variable is a count measure, a Poisson process provides a
natural baseline for modeling the growth of high schools (Hannan and Freeman
1987, 1989). However, Poisson regression should not be applied in the case of
overdispersion (McCullagh and Nelder 1989). Overdispersion does not affect
the coefficient estimates, but results in underestimated standard errors. Negative
binomial regression adequately deals with this issue by adding a stochastic error
component, following a gamma distribution, to the model (Cattani, Pennings,
and Wezel 2003). The structure of the data is a pooled cross-section and time
series (districts * years). Pooled data generally exhibit autocorrelation.
Following Baron, Hannan, and Burton (2001), we use Liang and Zeger’s (1986)
method of generalized estimating equations (GEE), which generalizes quasi-
likelihood estimation to the panel data context, and which is a very flexible way
to deal with clustered data. We assume an exchangeable autocorrelation struc-
ture. Because the observations within the districts cannot be assumed to be inde-
pendent, we report Huber-White robust standard errors. A drawback of GEE is
that summary goodness-of-fit statistics are problematic because the residuals of
these models are correlated (Ballinger 2004; Zorn 2001). We therefore report
Wald chi-square statistics, which test the null hypothesis that all regression coef-
ficients are equal to zero. As Ballinger (2004, 146) warned, this statistic is not
suited to compare the goodness of fit of alternative models. All models are esti-
mated using the XTGEE routine of version 10.0 of STATA.
Findings
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between the variables are re-
ported in tables 1 and 2. Tables 3, 4, and 5 provide GEE negative binomial
regression estimates of the growth of Islamic, cosmopolitan, and regular high
schools, respectively. We add analyses with regular high school growth as the
dependent variable to shed further light on the underlying cross-form interac-
tions (see below).
Both types of high schools grow slower in the East and Southeast of Turkey
(Marmara being the omitted region). In central Anatolia, Islamic high schools
grow faster, and in the Black Sea region cosmopolitan high schools grow slower.
District population strongly spurs the growth of both Islamic and cosmopolitan
high schools, and population growth hampers their growth. National GDP is
negatively related to the growth of Imam Hatip high schools, and positively to
the growth of cosmopolitan high schools. This finding is related to the rise of a
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devout bourgeoisie middle class, whose welfare started to increase over time,
and hence did not want to send their children to Imam Hatip high schools any-
more. The percentage of people in the district voting on Islamic parties has the
expected effect: positive on Islamic and negative on cosmopolitan high schools.
As expected, the 1976 regulation strongly enhanced the growth of Islamic high
schools, whereas the 1997 regulation reduced its growth in favor of cosmopoli-
tan high schools.
Model 2 in table 3 shows a strong positive effect of ideological polarization
on the growth of Islamic high schools. This estimate does not change when we
add the densities of the three high school types (model 3 in table 3). For cosmo-
politan high schools, we find a marginally significant negative effect of ideologi-
cal polarization that becomes insignificant, however, when we control for the
high school type densities (models 2 and 3 in table 4). These findings provide
partial support for H1: ideological polarization spurs the growth of Islamic high
schools, but not that of cosmopolitan high schools. The estimates of model 3 in
both tables 3 and 4 provide support for H2a and 2b: the nature of interdepen-
dence between both extreme high school forms is mutualistic. The positive
impact of cosmopolitan on Islamic high schools (B = 0.13) is much larger than
the other way around (B = 0.04).
Model 4 in table 3 reveals that the mutualistic effect of cosmopolitan on
Islamic high schools is attenuated by the extent of ideological polarization, as is
clear from the negative and significant interaction effect of cosmopolitan high
school density and ideological polarization, providing support for H3. Figure 2
Table 1. Descriptives of Major Variables under Study
Mean S.D. Min Max
Growth of Islamic schools 0.22 0.66 0 9
Growth of cosmopolitan schools 0.20 0.72 0 12
Growth of regular schools 0.71 1.31 0 21
Ln (District population) (t-1) 13.15 0.71 10.13 16.01
District population growth (t-1) 0.02 0.21 −0.90 0.17
Educational expenditure (t-1) 11.28 2.34 7.23 15.10
GDP (t-1) 218.44 72.42 110.65 363.25
Votes Islamic parties 11.12 10.29 0 51.60
Regulation 1976 0.83 0.38 0 1
Regulation 1997 0.08 0.27 0 1
Ideological polarization 0.95 0.18 0.41 1.43
Density Islamic schools (t-1) 3.91 3.44 0 21
Density cosmopolitan schools (t-1) 0.83 1.73 0 23
Density regular schools (t-1) 15.77 15.99 0 171
Proportion females in Islamic schools (t-1) 0.06 0.08 0 1
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Table 2. Correlations of Major Variables under Studya
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Growth of Islamic schools −
2. Growth of cosmopolitan
schools
0.002 −
3. Growth of regular schools 0.08* 0.03 −
4. Ln (District population)
(t-1)
0.15* 0.28* 0.38* −
5.District population growth
(t-1)
−0.004 −0.004 −0.01 0.02 −
6. Educational expenditure
(t-1)
−0.05* −0.21* 0.14* −0.05* −0.001 −
7. GDP (t-1) −0.08* 0.37* −0.10* 0.06* 0.001 −0.32* −
8. Votes Islamic parties −0.005 0.17* −0.06* −0.01 0.07* 0.10* 0.49* −
9. Regulation 1976 0.08* 0.12* −0.10* 0.09* −0.005* −0.40* 0.59* 0.16* −
10. Regulation 1997 −0.09* 0.44* −0.11* 0.01 −0.01 −0.46* 0.55* 0.31* 0.13* −
11. Ideological polarization 0.17* −0.17* 0.07* 0.08* 0.004 0.20* −0.37* −0.17* 0.01 −0.24* −
12. Density Islamic schools
(t-1)
0.01 0.37* 0.15* 0.59* −0.02 −0.26* 0.43* 0.11* 0.40* 0.17* −0.19* −
13. Density cosmopolitan
schools (t-1)
0.07* 0.59* 0.23* 0.53* 0.01 −0.14* 0.48* 0.25* 0.19* 0.36* −0.17* 0.54* −
14. Density regular schools
(t-1)
0.15* 0.40* 0.38* 0.76* 0.001* −0.09* 0.27* 0.09* 0.23* 0.08* −0.02 0.67* 0.78* −
15. Proportion females in
Islamic schools (t-1)
−0.07* 0.23* −0.06* 0.01 0.02 −0.20* 0.68* 0.49* 0.32* 0.43* −0.40* 0.42* 0.30* 0.13* −
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Table 3. Negative Binomial GEE Regression Estimates of the Growth in the Number of Islamic
High Schools, 1971–1998a
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant −3.48*** −4.65*** −7.61*** −9.40*** −9.38***
(0.71) (0.73) (1.44) (1.63) (1.90)
District territory change 0.63*** 0.71*** 0.31+ 0.11 0.04
(0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.30) (0.31)
Mediterranean region 0.09 0.18 0.45+ 0.07 0.16
(0.19) (0.16) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Eastern Anatolia −0.75*** −0.57*** −0.42* −0.64*** −0.53**
(0.18) (0.15) (0.20) (0.17) (0.20)
Aegean region 0.24+ 0.26+ 0.46** 0.17 0.25
(0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Southeast Anatolia −0.81*** −0.68** −0.65+ −0.79** −0.81***
(0.25) (0.24) (0.34) (0.28) (0.25)
Central Anatolia 0.09 0.19* 0.64*** 0.28+ 0.46*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.20)
Black Sea region 0.12 0.17 0.48* 0.17 0.24
(0.13) (0.13) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17)
Ln (District population) (t-1) 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.52*** 0.65*** 0.66***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
District population growth (t-1) −0.50 −0.74 −1.39* −1.53* −1.36*
(0.52) (0.66) (0.56) (0.62) (0.66)
Educational expenditure (t-1) −0.22*** −0.22*** −0.25*** −0.23*** −0.24***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP (t-1) −0.01*** −0.01*** −0.005** −0.005** −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Votes Islamic parties 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Regulation 1976 1.13*** 0.84*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.94***
(0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Regulation 1997 −2.91*** −3.09*** −3.18*** −3.08*** −5.20***
(0.76) (0.74) (0.70) (0.73) (1.42)
Proportion females in Islamic
schools (t-1)
−0.88 0.76 1.24 1.67 −2.61
(1.22) (1.10) (1.45) (1.39) (1.95)
Ideological polarization 1.36*** 1.76*** 1.88*** 1.58***
(0.30) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Density Islamic schools (t-1) −0.15*** −0.16*** −0.15***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Density cosmopolitan schools (t-1) 0.13*** 0.90*** −0.22**
(0.03) (0.24) (0.08)
Density regular schools (t-1) −0.0005 0.01 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)




Density cosmopolitan schools (t-1)




Wald Chi2 979.98*** 1674.57*** 1079.91*** 1210.77*** 1280.96***
an = 1943; += p < 0.10 * = p < 0.05 ** = p < . 01 *** = p < 0.001 (two-tailed); robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4. Negative Binomial GEE Regression Estimates of the Growth in the Number of
Cosmopolitan High Schools, 1971–1998a
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant −13.38*** −12.86*** −14.71*** −13.09*** −15.28***
(0.61) (0.69) (1.64) (2.57) (1.58)
District territory
change
−0.17*** −0.16*** 0.20+ 0.18+ 0.18
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13)
Mediterranean region −0.02 −0.07 −0.08 −0.03 −0.11
(0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
Eastern Anatolia −0.57*** −0.58*** −0.55*** −0.51** −0.73***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.17) (0.12)
Aegean region −0.21* −0.22** −0.22* −0.16 −0.22**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Southeast Anatolia −0.35* −0.29* −0.41* −0.28 −0.56***
(0.16) (0.12) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16)
Central Anatolia −0.05 −0.09 −0.28* −0.25* −0.53***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.15)
Black Sea region −0.15* −0.15* −0.26* −0.25* −0.35***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09)
Ln (District
population) (t-1)
0.56*** 0.56*** 0.67*** 0.61*** 0.71***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11)
District population
growth (t-1)
−2.38*** −1.96* −2.19** −2.12* −2.15*
(0.66) (0.79) (0.82) (0.87) (0.84)
Educational
expenditure (t-1)
−0.02 −0.01 −0.003 −0.01 −0.002
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP (t-1) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Votes Islamic parties −0.01 −0.01 −0.02* −0.02** −0.01*
(0.005) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
Regulation 1976 0.88 1.01 0.58 0.39 0.71
(0.64) (0.67) (0.55) (0.55) (0.56)
Regulation 1997 0.13 0.18 0.79** 0.77** 0.66**
(0.18) (0.18) (0.30) (0.30) (0.25)
Prop. females in
Islamic schools (t-1)
0.16 0.02 −0.65 −0.48 −1.02
(0.32) (0.35) (0.63) (0.60) (0.63)
Ideological
polarization
−0.59+ −0.04 −0.85 −0.14
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visualizes this interaction. This moderation effect of ideological polarization
does not appear with respect to the impact of Islamic high school density on cos-
mopolitan high school growth (model 4 in table 4).
In model 5 in both tables 3 and 4, we test whether (relative) niche expansion
(i.e., proportion of female students in Islamic high schools) positively moderates
the mutualistic interdependence between both forms. Both interaction coeffi-
cients are significant: (relative) niche expansion indeed positively reinforces this
mutualistic interdependence, which provides evidence for H4a and 4b. Figures 3A
and B show both interactions.
Finally, to further explore the center–tail cross-form interaction, and hence to
reveal the underlying interactive processes, we estimate the same models to analyze
the growth of the regular high schools. District population increases the growth of
regular high schools, while the growth of district population has a negative effect
on the growth of regular high schools. The 1976 and 1997 regulations have a neg-
ative impact, too. Models 2 and 3 in table 5 reveal that neither ideological polariza-
tion nor the densities of Islamic and cosmopolitan high schools have a significant
impact on the growth of regular high schools. Important for our analyses is the
result in model 4 in table 5, which reveals a negative and significant interaction
effect of the density of Islamic high schools and ideological polarization. The inter-
action of cosmopolitan high school density and ideological polarization is also neg-
ative and significant (model 5 in table 5): Islamic and cosmopolitan high school
densities suppress the expansion of the regular high schools when ideological
polarization increases, suggesting strong competition between all forms. Moreover,
models 6 and 7 in table 5 show that the (relative) niche expansion variable does
not moderate the impact of Islamic or cosmopolitan high school density on the
growth of regular high schools. These findings suggest that the expansion of both
Islamic and cosmopolitan schools affects the growth of regular high schools, and
both school forms compete for the students at the center.
Finally, we ran a series of robustness analyses, all available upon request, to
explore the extent to which our findings might be sensitive to adding additional
control variables and different calculations of the polarization index. First, we
Table 4. continued













Wald Chi2 4472.35*** 4698.58*** 6281.23*** 5492.63*** 6447.41***
an = 1943; + = p < 0.10 * = p < 0.05 ** = p < 0.01 *** = p < 0.001 (two-tailed); robust standard
errors in parentheses.
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Table 5. Negative Binomial GEE Regression Estimates of the Growth in the Number of Regular High Schools, 1971–1998a
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Constant −7.18*** −7.06*** −7.23*** −8.34*** −7.59*** −7.34*** −7.35***
(0.29) (0.29) (0.41) (0.49) (0.47) (0.43) (0.50)
District territory change −0.25*** −0.24*** −0.16** −0.23*** −0.17** −0.19** −0.17**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Mediterranean region 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.09+ 0.14*** 0.12***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Eastern Anatolia 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.04
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Aegean region 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.15** 0.13** 0.09+ 0.14** 0.13*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Southeast Anatolia 0.03 0.03 −0.02 −0.01 −0.06 −0.03 −0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Central Anatolia 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.17***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Black Sea region 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.04 −0.04 0.01 −0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Ln (District population) (t-1) 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.51*** 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.47***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
District population growth (t-1) −1.56*** −1.58*** −1.66*** −1.17*** −1.72*** −1.69*** −1.68***
(0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.36) (0.28) (0.25) (0.25)
Educational expenditure (t-1) 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP (t-1) −0.0001 −0.0005 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Votes Islamic parties −0.0003 −0.0002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
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(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Regulation 1997 −0.48* −0.44* −0.41+ −0.48* −0.46* −0.45* −0.44+
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Prop. females in Islamic schools (t-1) −0.30 −0.32 −0.66 −1.42** −0.62 −1.69* −0.88
(0.51) (0.49) (0.50) (0.55) (0.50) (0.85) (0.63)
Ideological polarization −0.16 −0.18 0.25+ −0.03 −0.17 −0.19
(0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Density Islamic schools (t-1) 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.0001 0.01
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Density cosmopolitan schools (t-1) −0.004 0.01 0.15** −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Density regular schools (t-1) −0.002 −0.004** −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Density Islamic schools (t-1) * Ideological polarization −0.11***
(0.03)












Wald Chi2 2718.57*** 2849.94*** 3262.69*** 3127.64*** 4097.77*** 3252.33*** 3323.78***
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Figure 3. A. The interaction effect of the proportion of female students in Islamic schools to
all female students and cosmopolitan school density on Islamic school growth. B. The
interaction effect of the proportion of female students in Islamic schools and Islamic school
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added (1) dummy variables for the military coup years (see the section on the his-
tory of the Republic), (2) the density of science high schools, (3) the density of pri-
vate high schools, such as Robert College, and (4) a dummy for districts that have a
population above 250,000 (as a proxy for urbanization). Note that the density of
the other high school types is low in our time window. Second, we ran analyses
with our polarization index calculated using α = 0.4 and α = 1.2, employing linear
interpolation to fill in the years without elections. None of these robustness analyses
changed the results reported above, increasing our confidence in the results found.
Discussion
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Economic forces (i.e., national
GDP) positively affect the expansion of cosmopolitan high schools: this high
school form appears to follow general trends of economic development. State
regulation and the size of the local Islamic faction (i.e., the number of votes on
Islamic parties), in contrast, strongly affect the expansion of Islamic high
schools. Islamic–secular polarization at the district level has a strong mobilizing
impact on the growth of these Islamic high schools over and above the size of
the local Islamic faction. Additionally, the interdependence between both organi-
zational forms is mutualistic, on average. Both forms stimulated each other’s
growth rate as a result of a sequence of movements and countermovements,
starting with the initial rise of Islamic high schools in the late 1970s.
The mutualistic effect of the cosmopolitan high schools on the growth of
Islamic high schools declines, however, with further increases with Islamic–secu-
lar polarization. Mutualism between rival ideology-laden organizational forms
is eventually repressed by ideological polarization, ceteris paribus. The expan-
sion of the resource space of Islamic high schools by allowing enrollment of
female students, in contrast, reinforces the mutualistic relationships between
both rival forms. Moreover, both Islamic and cosmopolitan schools feed on the
center, as the former grow at the expense of the latter when ideological polariza-
tion increases. This pattern of findings reveals that Islamic–secular polarization
shifts the density distribution of high schools with different ideologies such that
the number of rival ideology forms grows at the expense of the center.
A major underlying driver of this pattern of findings is the subtle balance
between two major conflicting forces that operate simultaneously: the mobilizing
force of ideological polarization and the repressing force of competition among
rival ideologies. The first force makes ideologies and values salient, and creates
strong subgroup identities that facilitate collective action (e.g., social movements
and/or government regulation). Such collective action subsequently spurs defen-
sive countermovements of the opposing ideology. The second force results from
the desire of adherents of specific ideologies to become dominant. The purpose
of ideological rivalry is to repress the rival ideology. The interplay between the
context’s opportunity structure and endogenous organizational dynamics deter-
mines which force dominates at a particular moment in time. As a result of this
complex interplay of conflicting forces, we cannot predict ex ante the specific
outcome of ideological rivalry (especially in settings where the contention
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remains unsettled). However, being able to ex post explain and understand the
mechanisms behind these processes is scientifically valuable in its own right
(Davis and Marquis 2005). Our community ecology approach reveals that for-
mal organizations play an important role in the rivalry among ideologies, as
such organizations serve as the vehicles of the diffusion of values in society. This
is literally the case for the high schools that we studied. By establishing formal
organizations, ideological rivalry is institutionalized in a relatively permanent
way, underscoring Tilly’s (1978) observation that organizations are important
in prevailing and promoting ideological positions.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to com-
munity ecology and the ecology of ideology. Although several ecologists have
stressed the importance of the study of interdependencies between different orga-
nizational forms, the number of such studies is still limited. Especially studies
that combine relations between (classes of) organizations (so-called functional
complementarities) with spatial differentiation are rare. In their review of the
field, Freeman and Audia (2006, 165) propose that “simultaneous consideration
of spatial and functional differentiation and complementarity can provide more
nuanced views of the mechanism underlying density effects.” This is exactly
what we sought to do in the present study by modeling the interplay between the
growth of different high school forms against the background of local ideologi-
cal differences (and state regulation). Related to this, we contribute to the ecol-
ogy of ideology by analyzing the dynamics of organizational forms with
dissimilar (opposing) ideologies that compete for similar resources, which has
been identified as a major gap in the literature (see also Boone and Özcan
[2014]). Although Simons and Ingram (2004) and Barnett and Woywode (2004)
already speculated about the importance of the conflicting forces central to our
argument, ours is one of the first studies that tries to unravel the conditions driv-
ing their relative impact. Most studies in this tradition implicitly assume that the
ideological contextual climate and critical resource base are constant over time.
By directly measuring shifts in ideological polarization and resource niches, we
show that the mutualistic interdependence between rival ideological forms is
suppressed by ideological polarization (as reflected in election outcomes) and re-
inforced by resource niche expansion (through state regulation).
Second, by introducing the moderating effects of ideological polarization and
state regulation, we contribute to “new organizational synthesis” research that
“goes beyond studying movements as movement organizations, aiming instead
to trace how movements shape organizational fields, and vice versa”
(Schneiberg, King, and Smith 2008, 636). We do not study movements directly,
but we do analyze the dynamic interplay between ideological struggles and the
expansion of organizational forms carrying specific ideologies. Although it is
generally accepted that organizations play a central role in facilitating many
kinds of collective actions, much less is known about whether, when, and how
social tension and conflict (such as polarization) affect the life chances of organi-
zations (Olzak and West 1991). We show that ideological polarization is a
major mobilizing force, having long-lasting effects on the specific development
of organizational fields of major importance, such as high school education. Our
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study reveals that the dynamics of contention, with its cycles of opportunity,
mobilization, and countermobilization, produces historical and path-dependent
trajectories of different kinds of organizations (Marquis and Lounsbury 2007;
Schneiberg, King, and Smith 2008).
Third, our study analyzes the impact of culture and policy by incorporating
both polarization and regulation, revealing that “policy makers should take
underlying cultural factors into account when anticipating the intended effects
of policy … Though policy may reflect majority will, there may be significant
pockets of resistance or social movements that condition the intended effect …
Thus, identifying the heterogeneous cultural beliefs and their organization may
be important when implementing policy” (Marquis and Huang 2009, 1242).
Turkish educational high school policies have generated many unexpected con-
sequences as a result of these heterogeneous and polarized beliefs. Islamic high
schools were regulated following the military coup of 1971 for the purpose of
controlling religious Islamic education in Turkey. However, their increasing
popularity spurred their numbers as well as the number of rival ideological high
school forms. Female emancipation policies enlarged the ideological battlefield
to competition in education. All this did not settle the issue of the role of Islam
in society, but is likely to have, in contrast, nurtured ideological polarization in
Turkey, which the government in the 1970s wanted to avoid in the first place.
Although we focused on the Turkish high school system, we think our com-
munity ecology framework can be applied to understand organizational dynam-
ics in many other settings as long as ideological polarization is salient. For
example, growing polarization can also be observed in the United States among
Democrats and Republicans with very clear-cut distinctions in terms of several
issues concerning healthcare, civil rights, immigrants, and so on (Jacobson
2016). This, in turn, is associated with the establishment of new organizations,
such as Breitbart and BuzzFeed, representing either side of the polarized debate.
Another example is the emergence of Islamic banking as an insurgent logic
against conventional banking in Turkey and other Islamic countries, fueled by
ideological competition between secular and traditional Islamic factions in soci-
ety (Boone and Özcan 2016).
Our study is not without limitations, which provide opportunities for further
research. First, the relationships between ideological polarization, state regulation,
and expansion of high school forms are reciprocal in nature. Regulation is not
exogenous, but affected by the distribution of ideological values. Moreover, differ-
ent school forms diffuse different ideologies among a society’s population, which
subsequently affects ideological polarization. As a first step, we decided to treat
state regulation and ideological polarization as context variables that affect the
growth of high school forms in a variety of ways. In future research, it would be
interesting to build models that focus on Islamic–secular polarization as the phe-
nomenon to explain, emphasizing this two-way channel of reciprocal causation.
Second, we only focused on the three major high school forms in Turkey.
More recently, interesting new high school types emerged that are probably also
related to the continuing ideological struggle in Turkey. For instance, hybrid
high school types were established, such as the Anatolian Imam Hatip high
schools. These schools blend the quality of non-religious Anatolian high schools
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(which we labeled cosmopolitan high schools) with the intensive Islamic educa-
tion of Imam Hatip high schools. Most courses in these schools are also taught
in foreign languages, as in cosmopolitan-secular high schools. At the other side
of the ideological spectrum, more and more private cosmopolitan high schools
emerged, where students have to pay for top-quality education. This suggests
that the frontline of the ideological struggle is gradually shifting to high-quality
education of the future elite in Turkish society.
Notes
1. Since Turkey is a secular country, officially all school types are secular. In this paper,
the secular-religious distinction does not refer to the formal status, but to the curricu-
lum of, and atmosphere in, the schools (Erkan and Akçayöz 2003; Pak 2004).
2. Note that all high school types analyzed in this study are public schools funded by
the state. None of them required a tuition fee.
3. Official aim refers to what is written in the mission statement of Imam Hatip high
schools.
4. We acknowledge that not all conservative families, especially Kurdish ones, were
comfortable with sending their children to Imam Hatip schools—not only their girls,
but also their boys. To this day, there are still informal madrasah in the Kurdish
area, which are run by local religious leaders, serving as an alternative to Imam
Hatip schools. The Kurdish conservative families historically have approached the
Imam Hatip schools with suspicion, mostly because of their mistrust in their secular
curriculum. Unfortunately, we do not have any other data on the number of students
attending madrasah instead of high schools (as these madrasah are informal, this
data is not available). Moreover, because of its politicized nature, the government
can decide to establish Imam Hatip high schools in Kurdish areas as a signal, irre-
spective of the number of students that go to Imam Hatip high schools. So, we only
focus on the number of high schools established, and not on the number of students
that go to these high schools.
5. These restrictions relate to the coefficients that are applied as weights to the high
school grades of students in order to determine whether a student is allowed to enter
the university. For instance, if an Imam Hatip high school graduate wanted to enter
the Theology faculty, then her high school grades were multiplied by 0.5; however, if
she wanted to enter any other faculty at the university, then her high school grades
were multiplied by 0.2. Obviously, this restriction was a disadvantage for Imam
Hatip high school graduates to enter university in comparison to other high school
graduates.
6. We employ the number of schools instead of the number of students because, in the
short run, mobilization is related to the emergence of different school types while
affecting the number of students in the long run.
7. Unfortunately, no information is available on the limited number of school closing
events.
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